

# An All-But-One Entropic Uncertainty Relation and Application to Password-based Identification

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


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


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
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A more well-known entropic UR:  
Maassen-Uffink (1988)



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## Remark

For “good” families,  $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} -\frac{1}{n} \log_2 c \in (0, \frac{1}{2}]$



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All-but-One Shannon Entropy Uncert. Relation

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All-but-One Shannon-Entr. UR  
(follows from Maassen Uffink)

New All-b.-One Min-Entropy UR

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Is this RV  $J'$  necessary?

Recall: For “good” families of bases on an  $n$ -qubit space,  
 $-\log(c)$  is linear in  $n$

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
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The family of (meas.) bases is  $\{\text{Comp, Hadamard}\}$ ,  
on  $n$  qubits for which  $c = 2^{-n/2}$

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Server

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
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- **unbounded** quantum storage + **bounded** quantum computation ??

## New: “Single-Qubit Operations Model” (SQOM)

- Malicious party has unbounded quantum storage,
- but is restricted to single-qubit operations and measurements

## Existing QID Scheme

### QID Scheme of Damgård et al. [DFSS07]

- Unconditionally secure against malicious user
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## Remark

Security proof of new QID scheme in BQSM is based on our uncertainty relation

Thank You